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The poor performance of the American economy since 1970 has 
given rise to numerous proposals to increase the role of government in 
supporting the commercialization of new technologies through government 
demonstration programs and other policies designed to promote a 
specific new technical idea. This paper examines the political 
incentives acting upon government in supporting new technology, using 
several specific cases to illustrate the general principle that 
targeted demonstration projects are more likely to be the cause of 
declining productivity of American Industry than to be the cure. 
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The decline in the growth of productivity in American 
industries has given rise to numerous proposals for government action 
to attack the problem. While many of these ideas are potentially 
useful and generate interesting discussion, the overall debate about 
the causes and cure for sagging productivity is in several ways 
dissatisfying. First, it tends not to be well informed about the 
experiences of history or of other countries today. Second, it 
typically does not address in a realistic, pragmatic way what 
government can � and cannot -- do well. 
A brief summary of the history of the economies of the 
advanced industrialized nations during the 1960s and 1970s illustrates 
the first point -- and brings out in bold relief that the United 
States is facing a truly perplexing problem. Consider the following 
paradoxes. 
1. In 1962, a 10 percent tax reduction (with no concommitant 
expenditure reduction) was followed by the longest continuous period 
of prosperity and productivity growth in American history; a similar 
action in 1981 preceded the worst recession since the economic 
readjustment at the close of World War II -- with there being some 
chance that it will grow to be the worst economic setback since the 
Great Depression. 
2. In 1965, J.-J. Servan-Schreiber's The American Challenge was 
published in the United States. Its main argument was that the United 
States was so overwhelming an economic force that the other advanced 
nations were highly unlikely ever to free themselves from American 
economic domination. Within ten years, exactly the same arguments 
were being made in the United States about Japan, West Germany � and 
even France. 
3. Americans are prone to blame the poor performance on the
productivity front on a long list of economic problems: OPEC, 
inflation, high interest rates, insufficient reinvestment in capital 
stock, etc. Yet there is no evidence that any of these is the cause 
of the problem. Other advanced industrialized nations have had to 
live with OPEC and with a greater dependence on imported energy 
resources than is the case in the United States. Most other advanced 
industrialized nations have experienced inflation and interest rates 
comparable to ours. And, despite several years of trying, absolutely 
no evidence has been found to support the view that either the quality 
or amount of investment per worker declined in the 1970s. 
Something very dramatic seems to have happened since the 
1960s. Other countries, faced with similar conditions, seem to be 
doing better than the United States, whereas they used to do worse. 
Conventional policy actions do not seem to work. So what has changed? 
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One candidate is the rise of environmental, health and safety 
regulation. The automobile industry is fond of attributing part of 
its decline to regulation, and business generally has argued that the 
costs of regulatory compliance are a major factor in the erosion of 
productivity growth. While there are undoubtedly many important 
examples of silly and overly expensive regulations, overall the 
argument as stated simp ly is not supported by the facts. The costs of 
regulatory compliance in the manufacturing sector explain at most 
20 percent of the drop in productivity growth. Moreover, in some 
of the most heavily regulated sectors -- agriculture and chemicals, 
for example � productivity performance has been much better than in 
most manufacturing industries. 
Nevertheless, there is a more subtle way in which regulation 
may be an important contributory factor. Much of regulation is an 
illustration of a more general phenomenon throughout the American 
spectrum of government policies that emerged in the 1970s. It is 
that, for the first time, public policy developed a ubiquitous, 
comprehensive stance on economic change. For the first time, 
government became self-conscious about the effect of government policy 
on the overall pattern of technological change and economic growth, 
and policie's were adopted to encourage certain kinds of technical 
advances � not at the level of basic research and advances in general 
knowledge, but at the level of pushing commercialized technology in 
specific ways. 
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It is the self-conscious development of public policies about 
new technology and economic change that is the focus of this paper. 
The argument is as follows: first, these policies have largely failed 
to obtain the specific technical goals that they were designed to 
achieve; second, they have created a potentially serious barrier to 
overall technical progress in the economy; and third, this failure is 
largely due to inherent problems with the way the government process 
works, rather than rectifiable mistakes, so that attempts to resolve 
the productivity predicament by an expanded governmental role in the 
development of new technology is more likely to make matters worse 
than to improve them. 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF TECHNOLOGY POLICIES 
Except for national defense, the United States government has 
normally kept itself free from policies to push particular 
technologies. But a qualitative change in policy took place in the 
1950s with the "Atoms for Peace" program. The light-water nuclear 
reactor, and later the liquid metal fast-breeder reactor, were 
technologies selected by government agencies to be commercialized, 
with substantial government subsidies along the way. They introduced 
the notion of government being in the business of demonstrating a new 
technology that for some reason the private sector was unwilling to 
pursue. These programs were followed by similar efforts in urban mass 
transit (leading to the San Francisco and Washington, D.C. subway 
systems) , construction (specifically targeted on improved productivity 
in housing construction) ,  and, most important of all, a wide array of 
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new energy technologies in the wake of the 1973 crisis in the world 
oil market. 
Regulation, too, took an increasingly important technological 
stance. Most obvious is so-called "technology-forcing" regulations. 
These are designed to guarantee a market for new methods to abate 
pollution or achieve other regulatory objectives. One technique is to 
enact a performance requirement before it is technically feasible; 
another is to require the best available control technology for any 
new facility -- the so-called new source performance standard. 
A third innovation in public policy was the scrutiny with 
which economic change was examined. The creation of the Office of 
Technology Assessment is symbolic, revealing the public stance that 
new technologies ought to be studied � and appropriately regulated 
before they are unleashed on the world. Implicit in this view is the 
notion that new technologies are more threatening than old, that if 
one is not careful, they are likely to make society worse off. Hand 
in hand with the skepticism of the new was protectionism for the old: 
the unprecedented move by the federal government into the bail-out of 
failing firms. Sometimes the bail-out took the form of direct subsidy 
(Lockheed and Chrysler) ; sometimes the technique was the use of 
protective regulation (the "trigger price" method for protecting 
domestic steel producers from foreign competition);  once it was even 
de facto nationalization (CONRAIL and AMTRAK). 
A common, easy judgment is to write off most of these ventures 
as failures. Certainly, if the basis for the judgment is to be the 
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extent to which they had a salutory effect on the development of 
beneficial technical advances, most were surely failures. But in some 
ways these policies are both better and worse: better in that they 
may have served other political purposes and so are looked upon with 
affection by some, worse in that their overall effect on the rate and 
direction of technological advance for the entire economy was perhaps 
the most devastating consequence. To illustrate these points, let us 
examine a few sacred cows: the Clinch River Breeder Reactor, the 
Space Shuttle, the stack-gas scrubber requirements for new coal-fired 
power plants, and the bail-outs. 
Clinch River1 
The Clinch River Breeder Reactor was initially proposed as the 
facility that was going to "demonstrate" the economic feasibility of 
breeder reactors in the United States. The original idea was that the 
facility would cost $200 million, with the government paying 40 
percent of the costs and electric utilities the remaining 60 
percent. It was to be completed by 1978, with expenditures beginning 
in fiscal 1970. Risks of cost overruns were to be assmned by the 
reactor manufacturer, in the spirit of the "turnkey" era of light­
water reactors a few years before.2 
By the fiscal 1982 budget, the cost estimate had escalated to 
$3 billion, no construction had yet been started even though several 
hundred million dollars had already been spent, and the expected 
completion date was 1990 -- that is, in twelve years the time horizon 
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for completing the project had not advanced at all. But the project 
remains the single highest priority energy research and development 
activity of the federal government. 
This is all the more surprising when one examines the 
diminishing rationale for the project. In the late 1960s, the Clinch 
River Breeder Reactor was at the edge of technology; by the early 
1980s, it was outmoded. The original rationale of demonstrating the 
commercial feasibility of breeders was also influenced by a strong 
economic case for them. Until energy prices began escalating in the 
1970s, energy use had been growing substantially more rapidly than the 
overall economy. In order to provide generation capacity for rapid 
growth in elecricity use, nuclear reactors were expected to be far 
more important in the United States energy picture than they in fact 
turned out to be. Breeders were expected to be an economic necessity 
by the mid-1980s because of the importance, by that time, of their 
effects on fuel supply and waste disposal requirements. 
Rapidly increasing real prices of all forms of energy during 
the 1970s caused the United States to turn to energy conservation, 
rather than increased supplies. Regulatory and political problems 
certainly affected the growth of nuclear power; however, had energy 
use grown as rapidly as had been predicted, these factors probably 
would have been overcome by an overwhelming economic need for more 
generation capacity. But stagnant energy demand made it inexpensive 
to oppose nuclear power. In any case, between 1970 and 1980 the 
predicted date at which the country would need breeders was moved from 
1985 to 2020 � that is, the date was speeding into the future at a 
rate of 3.5 years per year! Meanwhile, numerous technical problems 
arose in the design of the Clinch River reactor that required more 
research and development. 
In the private sector, all of these facts would quite likely 
have led to a reorientation of the program away from commercialization 
and back towards research. The distant time-horizon for an economic 
need, the technical problems encountered in design and component 
production, and the escalating cost of the basic technology would all 
have pointed towards this change in emphasis. But for Clinch River, 
the declining importance of a commercial feasibility demonstration led 
to a redefinition of the purposes, but not the nature, of the project. 
The first change was to redefine the thing to be demonstrated 
from economic feasibility to technical feasibility � that is, to show 
that a breeder reactor of this size and type would work. But in the 
mid-1970s, two things were happening. In Europe, technical 
feasibility of the concept of a breeder was already demonstrated by 
the French Phoenix. In addition, the design of the Clinch River 
Breeder Reactor with respect to fuel composition, the nature of the 
heat transfer system, and other technical matters came increasingly 
into question as a potentially useful technology to demonstrate. 
Interest began to grow in experimenting with different approaches to 
improve performance, reduce costs and enhance safety. 
That the Clinch River reactor gradually became a technology in 
which there was declining interest in a technical demonstration led 
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once again not to a redefinition of the program back towards research, 
but a redefinition of the objectives of the demonstration. By the 
late 1970s, it became to demonstrate the possibility of building and 
operating a breeder, regardless of design or economics. One element 
was to demonstrate that it was feasible to license a breeder reactor 
in the commercial (as opposed to experimental) reactor licensing 
process at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; e.g. the Department of 
Energy was to demonstrate that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission could 
perform its function. The other element was symbolic: to demonstrate 
nationally and internationally the commitment of the United States to 
nuclear power in the face of political opposition to it at home and 
abroad. 
The lesson of the Clinch River Breeder Reactor as I interpret 
it is as follows. The government, once couanitted to a large-scale, 
technology-forcing demonstration project faced great difficulty in 
turning it off. This observation has nothing to do with the wisdom of 
the nuclear power strategy for future energy development, nor of the 
breeder concept. Assuming that the United States must continue to 
depend heavily on nuclear power and, by 2020 or some such date, must 
have a commercialized breeder technology, the conclusion still remains 
that Clinch River should have been canceled several years ago. The 
attenuated time horizon for its need, the unanticipated technical 
problems, and the results of the Phoenix demonstration in France all 
should have led to a major reemphasis in the breeder reactor program 
towards research on components of the system where technical 
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uncertainties remained. But once a commitment was made to 
demonstration, it proved difficult to turn off. 
The source of the continuing commitment to the project has 
been Congress. In nearly every year since 1970, Congress has ended up 
appropriating more for the project than was requested by the 
President. And, in the late 1970s, the Carter Administration tried to 
reallocate substantial portions of the Clinch River budget to the 
larger research program in civilian reactors generally and the 
specific research program dedicated to liquid metal fast breeders. In 
fiscal 1979, Congress more than doubled the President's request, and 
in fiscal 1980 and 1981, when the President requested nothing for the 
Clinch River program, Congress continued to allocate full funding. 
The effect on the American research program for nuclear power 
has been dramatic. In 1970, Clinch River was estimated to consume 
about 1 percent of the total budget for research on civilian 
reactors and 2 percent of all research on breeders. By 1982, these 
proportions were 34 percent and 40 percent, respectively. Opponents 
of nuclear power may find some solace in these figures, but proponents 
who believe in the future of nuclear energy and the breeder ought to 
wonder whether this continued pursuit of an outmoded, costly project 
will undermine the nation's ability to develop a usable technology. 
Space Shuttle 
The original idea of the space shuttle circa 1970 was to 
develop a commercially important space transportation system that used 
reusable launch vehicles that could carry large payloads at a cost per 
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pound that was much lower than could ever be achieved with expendable 
launch vehicles. The aim was twofold: to reduce the costs of 
launches for civilian and military space programs, and to achieve low 
enough costs for business to find space commercially attractive for 
some manufacturing activities. 
Of course, building a reusable launch vehicle that was capable 
of carrying a manned crew and a very large payload was known to be 
very expensive compared to building an expendable launcher for smaller 
payloads. The plan was to make up the cost differential by using the 
space shuttle very frequently over a long useful life. 
Unfortunately, as work on the space shuttle progressed, 
unanticipated problems arose � as might naturally be expected in any 
research and development activity that attempts such a great leap 
forward in technology. For one thing, expectations about the size of 
the payload had to be scaled back as it became clear that the space 
shuttle was going to have substanitally less power at launch than was 
originally hoped. For another thing, the turn-around time on the 
ground had to be longer, and cost much more, than was initially 
expected because the vehicle was less resilient, and more vulnerable 
to its own shaking at launch, than was initially expected. Of course, 
smaller payloads and less frequent, more costly launches meant that the 
cost per pound of payload went up dramatically � so much so that it 
may never catch up to expendable vehicle capabilities. With these 
developments, of course, the interests of business in commercial use 
of shuttle capacity faded -- somewhat fortunately in a sense, since 
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the number of launches that were possible shrunk so dramatically that 
they approached the number needed for military and civilian space 
programs. 
All of these things became evident in the mid-1970s, and 
became painfully obvious a few years later as the space shuttle began 
to absorb an increasing share of the nation's space budget. Indeed, 
cost-overruns led to drastic cuts in the most dramatically successful 
part of the space program during the period, the unmanned photographic 
missions to the planets (and the attendant scientific work that 
occupied most of the space on these missions) . This was, of course, 
ironic, in that one purpose of the space shuttle was to reduce launch 
costs for deep space missions so that, among other things, the nation 
could afford more and better space science. 
Once again, the rational business strategy circa 1976 or 1977 
would have been to reorient the program. More research was clearly 
going to be required on both the launch system and the spacecraft 
itself if the objective of low costs and large payloads was to be 
achieved. Meanwhile, great progress had been made on expendable 
vehicles, which were providing increasingly reliable and inexpensive 
service. Thus, continued primary reliance on expendable launch 
technology, with a space shuttle program designed more for research 
and development purposes than for commercialization, was a preferable 
option for all concerned: the military, NASA and potential private 
sector customers. 
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Instead, the nation redefined its goals in the space shuttle 
program and proceeded to convert it to the only American launch 
system. The policy became the following: (1) to base the American 
launch system on the necessity to use men as pilots, rather than 
unmanned systems, as an end in itself, rather than because the former 
was in some sense a better approach; and (2) to redefine the purposes 
of the space program as being those things that best suit the shuttle, 
rather than designing a launch system to perform the nation's most 
desired objectives. By the 1980s, all civilian space missions had to 
be designed to use the shuttle, even though that meant using a more 
expensive launch system (and thereby fewer missions for a given 
budget) and ruling out some of the more promising missions for which 
the shuttle was unsuited (even though they would be cheaper than the 
less desirable substitutes that the shuttle can handle) . 
As with the Clinch River Breeder Reactor, the space shuttle 
demonstrates the tenaciousness with which government demonstration 
programs cling to life long after their commercial appropriateness has 
been called into question. And, like Clinch River, the cost to the 
American space effort may well be that we lose our leadership. While 
we have been developing the space shuttle, the European Space Agency 
has been developing the next generation of expendable launch vehicles, 
and soon will be able to undertake cheaper and better space projects 
than we can. The space shuttle has caused us to cancel our 
participation in one major multinational activity, the International 
Solar-Polar Mission, and to be the only country active in space that 
13 
will not investigate Halley's Comet when it next passes in 1986. The 
Japanese, Europeans, Canadians and Russians will all be there. 
Meanwhile, there is some chance that by 1986 the space shuttle will 
still not be capable of launching a spacecraft for planetary 
exploration. 
Were the sacrifice of scientific objectives accompanied by a 
commerically usable vehicle, the cost/benefit calculation would at 
least have some chance of proving the program worthwhile. But the 
program has no significant benefits that could not have been achieved 
by a scaled down program: one or two space shuttles instead of five, 
one space shuttle port (at Kennedy Space Center) rather than two (the 
second will be Vandenberg), and continuation of parallel development 
of expendable vehicles. Like the breeder, the space shuttle was 
pushed too fast; unlike the breeder, we have gone one step further, 
placing total reliance on the new technology long before it is ready. 
And, like the breeder, the impact on other elements of the space 
program � both research and utilization activities is seriously to 
retard progress, and perhaps cost the nation leadership in a major new 
technical arena. 
Scrubbers 
A political event of major national importance in the late 
1960s was the rise in popularity of government programs in the 
environmental, health and safety area. Especially important was 
significant increases in the �o1111Ilitment of government to improve air 
and water pollution. 
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A major early skirmish in the battle to clean up the 
environment was the controversy between regulators and the automobile 
industry over emissions reductions for automobiles. The reluctance of 
some in the industry to take any significant steps in this direction 
led proponents of environmental policies to conclude that business 
could not be relied upon to improve technology for emissions 
reduction. The result was a new concept, technology-forcing 
regulation, whereby government would require universal adoption of 
technologies either that did not yet exist or that were currently so 
expensive and/or ineffective that they did not make sense to adopt. 
The idea was that by forcing technology, government would create the 
necessary pressure on industry to come up with something that worked 
-- and to guarantee a market for it when it was developed. 
An excellent example of this type of regulation is the new 
source performance standards for coal-fired electric generation 
facilities that were written into the Clean Air Act amendments of 
1977.3 These require a fixed percentage reduction in potential 
emissions, regardless of the characteristics of the fuel that is used, 
that can only be satisfied by installing stack-gas scrubbers. What 
this means is that electric utilities have no reason to burn 
relatively clean coal -- coal that has a very low sulfur content � 
for even if they do, they must still reduce their emissions by the 
same fixed percentage that would be required if they burned dirty 
coal. Burning clean coal with no scrubbers is both cheaper and 
creates less pollution than burning dirty coal with a scrubber. Thus, 
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the new source performance standard, by pushing the industry towards 
scrubbing technology, achieves worse enviromnental results, but 
manages to cost more in the process. 
This is not the only effect. By making new coal-fired plants 
install scrubbers, Congress created an economic incentive not to build 
new generation facilities. Instead, utilities will find it more 
attractive to keep old, inefficient facilities -- which normally are 
not required to use scrubbers. The older facilities are even more 
polluting, and are less efficient in the conversion of fuel to 
electricity. Thus, in addition to having more pollution and higher 
costs than are necessary, the nation also has the pleasure of using 
its energy resources faster. 
The effect of such a decision illustrates an important 
consequence of poorly designed regulatory programs. Every measure of 
productivity we can imagine will suffer from retarding the rate at 
which new technology (here electric generation plants) is adopted and, 
when it is adopted, insisting that it use inefficient methods to 
achieve regulatory goals. Lower sales of generation equipment will 
lower the incentives to invest in research in the technology. Now, if 
the result were maximal achievement of enviromnental goals, one could 
at least have an interesting argument about whether the effort was 
worthwhile; however, the approach of specifying the scrubber 
technology (not allowing an equal chance for coal desulfurization and 
low-sulfur coal, or even combinations of the three that involve less 
scrubbing) gives one technology a boost, but handicaps others that 
16 
look more promising both economically and environmentally. To 
justify these standards, the government had to redefine its goals in 
dealing with electric generation facilities. No longer was the object 
of policy to reduce SOX emissions for electric generation facilities 
and thereby reduce particulate matter in the atmosphere as well as 
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acid rain. Instead, the objective became to promote scrubber technology. 
Bail-Outs 
The last example from the 1970s to be examined here is the 
emergence of quasinationalization of failing firms and industries. 
Three important cases are the railroads, Lockheed and Chrysler. 
In each case, the government can claim to have been partly 
responsible for the problems of the failing firms. Lockheed was 
subjected to considerable pressure to use Rolls Royce engines from 
Britain for reasons of international relations. This was not a good 
choice, for the bankruptcy and nationalization of Rolls Royce was partly 
responsible for cost and delay problems in introducing the L-1011 
aircraft in the wide-body market. The railroads' problems were surely 
aggravated by transportation regulation, which has tended to favor 
airlines and trucks and, therefore, has contributed to the decline of 
the railroads. Chrysler, as all American automobile manufacturers, has 
suffered because complying with various regulatory standards for 
emissions, safety and fuel efficiency is more difficult for large cars 
than for small ones. 
At the same time, the policy necessity of saving all three, 
particularly in the manner it was done, can be called to question. 
The L-1011 was one of three wide-body aircraft introduced at about the 
same time in the United States; had the L-1011 not been introduced, it 
is not at all clear that the entire slack would not have been taken up 
by Boeing and MacDonald-Douglas. Moreover, to the extent that the 
L-1011 was a commercially viable product, bankruptcy of Lockheed would 
not have led to the cancellation of the plane and the shut-down of the 
assembly line. Rather, the Lockheed creditors would have sold or 
reorganized L-1011 production as a valuable going concern. 
The railroads, meanwhile, have suffered at least as much from 
their own management and labor practices as from regulation. 
Moreover, some rail services -- notably passenger trains � are 
probably uneconomic in any case in the American market. Even European 
passenger rails also tend to be big subsidy sinks. 
Chrysler also is not free of responsibility for its fate. It 
was laggardly in shifting to smaller cars even in relation to other 
American manufacturers, and was the most resistant of the three major 
manufacturers to environmental, safety and fuel efficiency 
regulation. 
But the real question is not whether in some sense these 
companies ought to be saved through subsidies (Chrysler or Lockheed) 
or even nationalized (some railroads). More important is the 
implication of the policy for the overall performance of the economy 
-- and with regard to the government's abilities to make decisions 
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about the structure of the economy. To be willing to save very large 
firms when they are in trouble is to do two things: to lessen the 
cost of mismanagement and an eroded competitive position, and to favor 
large, bureaucratized companies over companies that are not large 
enough to be politically visible and therefore eligible for help. In 
automobiles (and steel as well) , productivity per worker in the newest 
plants is high; the problems, in addition to high labor costs, have to 
do primarily with older, lower-productivity, outmoded facilities. 
Saving companies with heavy investments in the old � and keeping them 
operating at losses -- obviously hurts rather than helps in advancing 
productivity. Moreover, while the largest firms have historically 
been an important source of steady, incremental change in technology, 
major break-throughs have tended to come from smaller companies. 
Innovation in relation to size tends to be highest among medium-sized 
firms.4 Encouraging firms to be large and politically visible so the 
government will bail out their mistakes is therefore contrary to the 
nation's interest in rapid technological advance. 
Summary of Lessons from the Seventies 
These and other examples of government actions affecting 
technological advance produce some lessons. First, government tends 
to pick losers that the business community elects not to touch. 
Second, once into something, the government has a hard time changing 
direction or backing out. In regulatory policy, this has been called 
the "tar-baby effect": the tendency of one regulatory action to lead 
to another to offset the unanticipated problems of the first.5 But 
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the phenomenon is more general: the government could not cut losses or 
change directions in Clinch River or the space shuttle, and a sequence 
of poor policy choices ended up with the new source performance 
standards in environmental regulations and bail-outs and 
nationalizations in rails, autos and aircraft. Third, government is 
prone to redefining objectives as a program evolves, rather than 
adjusting programs to meet the initial objectives. Moreover, there is 
a natural progression from efficiency objectives to technical 
objectives to symbolic objectives as the program unravels more and 
more. When one hears politicians talking in vague ways about "showing 
the world we are still c011DD.ited to X," one knows that the technical 
and economic merits of the project no longer justify it! 
The Political Economy of Industrial Policy 
The task that remains is to find a systematic explanation for 
why the preceding observations are true. The search starts with the 
following presumption: that the people who advocate policies like the 
ones described above are intelligent and are rationally pursuing 
objectives that are sensible. The explanation sought should not turn 
on the superior wisdom of the critic, but the differences in 
perceptions between the critic and the advocate about what is worth 
doing -- and why these differences might arise. 
The argument made here is that the political environment is 
not primarily interested in efficiency because the incentives facing 
people in politics are not closely related to it. Consequently, 
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government actions will give very little weight to these concerns. As 
a result, an industrial policy at the level of specific firms, 
industries and regions is especially pernicious, for goals other than 
efficiency, productivity advance, and performance will dominate the 
actions of the government. 
The analysis begins with two assumptions: politicians want to 
be reelected, and citizens are motivated by self-interest when 
confronted with matters of national economic policy. What foliows 
will be some simple propositions derived from these assumptions. 
First, when a politician calculates the costs and benefits of 
a proposed policy, the procedure is quite different than for 
conducting an economic benefit/cost analysis. The politician, seeking 
reelection, seeks to provide benefits to constituents in the hope that 
grateful constituents will be favorably inclined on voting day. One 
of the deliverables is government goods. Another is the expenditures 
on their production that are made in the district of the specific 
member of the legislature who can then claim credit for getting the 
project. Thus, some elements of the economic cost of a program will 
be perceived as a benefit by politicians.6 
A second source of difficulty is the low information content 
of most elections, and the implications this has for campaign 
strategies. A rational voter, having little effect on the outcome of 
an election, will devote little time and cost to gaining expertise on 
a wide spectrum of issues in order to identify the best candidate. 
Instead, voters will be quite passive, responding to information 
provided for them by others and assessing candidates on the basis of 
their perception of the general state of affairs and any personal 
experiences with politicians that they have had. From the standpoint 
of a candidate, this creates a strong incentive to campaign on issues 
that are not controversial, and to avoid specific discussions on 
issues in which the candidate may have participated in a decision that 
was either controversial or a mistake.7 Among the characteristics of 
politicians that this induces are never admitting mistakes, finding 
scapegoats (preferably in the bureaucracy) for the mistakes that 
become public issues, favoring extensive bureaucracy for taking blame 
and for extensive symbolic reporting and monitoring of a program, 
emphasizing vague, symbolic issues (international threats, general 
economic progress), and taking credit for jobs and projects when 
dealing with recipients of federal contracts. 
A third problem is the procedural bias in government processes 
in favor of the old over the new. The Constitutional due process 
clause has led to the development of a number of procedural and 
substantive safeguards for people who might be harmed by a change in 
government policy. Moreover, political processes tend to favor the 
established over the proposed because the identity of the 
beneficiaries of the status quo is normally better known than the 
potential winners if a change takes place. For example, the people 
who work at an inefficient plant that is threatened with closure are 
identifiable and usually organized, whereas the people who will work 
at a modern, efficient facility to be opened in the future are not 
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fully aware of that fact, and are probaby not organized. Thus, once a 
government activity is undertaken, a political constituency is created 
for continuing it that is stronger than the constituency that brought 
it about. The result is apparent in Congressional voting on program 
budgets. Programs that are highly controversial when enacted and that 
pass by very slim majorities within a short time are likely to be 
reauthorized and budgeted by near-unanimity. An outstanding example is 
Medicare, a program that took several years to pass and eventually 
barely squeeked through, but that within a few years had become an 
untouchable, "uncontrollable" item in the budget of a very conservative 
Republican President. 
Finally, as far as the dollars at stake are concerned, the 
"politics of efficiency" is small potatoes in the greater scheme of 
things at stake in the political process. When the economy is 
performing poorly, productivity is "creeping" along at 1 or 2 percent 
per year; when the economy is really humming, it is "racing" forward at 
3 or 4 percent! Thus, at stake is 1 or 2 percent of national income. 
And, of course, on any specific issue, the productivity effect is very 
tiny no single government program accounts for a very large fraction 
of the total effect government has on technological advance and 
productivity enhancement. The amount of money at stake in a government 
program usually will be very large in relation to its productivity 
effect; hence the quest for establishing the size of the program and 
obtaining the contracts will dominate all else. 
23 
All of these phenomena add up to the pattern we have observed 
in the government programs described above. Programs are undertaken 
to provide benefits to constituents in numerous forms besides the 
particular objective of the program in terms of ultimate output or 
outcome. Hence, a program with poor technical and economic prospects 
(e.g. a loser) may be adopted because of its favorable impact on 
supporting constituents. In any event, once the program is underway, 
it generates new political momentum from its costs as well as its 
benefits. In addition, political actors will seek to avoid careful 
scrutiny of its progress, especially if the technical success does not 
become an important political issue. Even if the project becomes 
known in the government as less than a success, there will be 
important political reasons to continue to def end it -- and to defend 
it in the form of symbolic, general issues that are least likely to 
stir controversy. 
These arguments all operate at the level of the general theory 
of the political process with respect to a broad category of programs 
namely, programs that involve specific, visible expenditures or 
other actions that hit specific subsets of the population. Targeted 
programs for enhancing technology, like Clinch River and the space 
shuttle, have characteristics placing them in the same category as 
rivers and harbors, post offices, and other elements of the political 
pork barrel. So, too, do industry-specific assistance programs, like 
bail-outs and technology-forcing regulation. Thus, the 
characteristics observed in these activities, and in particular the 
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tenacious clinging to a poorly performing approach, is a predictable 
feature of any such program. 
For this reason, to undertake to solve the nation's technical 
and productivity problems through government demonstrations and other 
targeted, big ticket industry aid programs is likely to hurt, rather 
than help, the economic future of the country. Such programs in the 
1970s deflected technical resources into large projects that had low 
payoffs, and kept resources in places where productivity was neither 
high nor advancing. 
The preceding argument does not lead to the conclusion that 
government has no necessary or beneficial role in enhancing the growth 
of productivity. The logic of the preceding argument warns against 
certain kind of approaches, not against policy altogether. The key is 
to structure programs such that a major theme for assessing them is 
performance, and to avoid the political benefits of economic costs. 
All expenditure programs will have the characteristic of generating 
their own political inertia; however programs that lack the targeting 
feature, that cannot easily become aimed at a specific industry or 
geographic region, stand a better chance of success, as do programs 
where individual technical decisions are not made, and do not have to 
be defended, by political leaders. General support for research and 
development, especially without targeting to a specific industry and 
without government management of the projects, is likely to be freer 
of distracting political incentives than targeted programs are likely 
to be. A similar argument can be made for programs to support 
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expanded technical education or for tax incentives for corporations to 
undertake more research. 
Since the middle of the nineteenth century, the American 
economic system has performed quite well. Our problems in recent 
years should not make us lose sight of the overall historical record, 
which is impressive, indeed. One interpretation of the decade of the 
1970s is that the economic system that brought us this far is now 
outmoded, and requires a far more active role for government in 
selecting and promoting new technology. Another interpretation is 
essentially exactly the opposite: that the lesson of the 1970s should 
be that we began in earnest to undertake such a government policy, and 
it produced very poor results. 
The government has done quite well in research and development 
activities that have not had commercialization as a primary objective. 
The Apollo Project at NASA is an outstanding example. But the country 
may have made a false generalization in believing that government 
commercial demonstration projects would work out as well. The 
economic and political forces at work in the latter simply do not mesh 
with high performance. The tenacious commitment that is necessary for 
an Apollo Project to push ahead regardless of the costs and problems 
is inappropriate when the purpose is economic performance, not 
technical achievement. Recognition of the differences in orientation 
between government and business is essential to designing public 
policies that work -- and especially so in trying to attack the 
productivity problem in a way that proves effective. The lesson is to 
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stay away from programs that look like pork barrel; to keep the 
government operating at a high level of generality in program areas 
that enhance the nation's underlying technical resources, but to avoid 
asking the government to pick winners. 
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